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Abstract
This thesis presents a method to assess the safety of transitions from au-
tomated to manual driving when vehicle automation fails. The method is
based on contributions to the understanding of human driving behavior,
also presented in this thesis. Interviews with drivers and driving simulator
studies of driving with automation, and particularly analyzes of situations
where automation failed provided the base for the proposed method. Among
the results of the studies, it was found that drivers were more likely to con-
trol an automation failure if automation was only replacing the driver in
longitudinal control of the vehicle, i.e., steering still managed by the driver.
Moreover, the studies found that drivers responded to the failures with vary-
ing success. For the most critical failures, almost half of the drivers collided,
while for a less critical failure, about two thirds of the drivers managed to
control the situation and avoid a collision.
Individual differences between drivers were considered to have contributed
to the varying success to control automation failures. The proposed method
for assessing the safety of transitions therefore adapts online to the individ-
ual driver. While the vehicle is driven manually, the driver’s capability to
control the vehicle is estimated and described as a subset of the vehicle’s
state-space. In the event of an automation failure, the proposed method as-
sesses whether vehicle states are within this subset or not. If vehicle states
are within the subset, the driver is deemed capable of taking over, and the
transition to manual control is classified as safe.
The method has been evaluated on data from real vehicles, with human
drivers, to demonstrate its performance. Results indicate that the proposed
method correctly classifies transitions as safe or unsafe.
Keywords: Driver takeover, safety, functional safety, automated driving,
vehicle automation, controllability, brake failure, driver capability, driving
simulator.
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Part I
Introductory chapters

Chapter 1
Introduction
The task of driving a vehicle is changing for the driver. Instead of relying
only on his or her own skills to safely control the vehicle, the driver is now
assisted by computer-based systems in several driving-related tasks. For
instance, a driver assistance system that has been on the market for more
than ten years is the adaptive cruise control (ACC). This system assists the
driver with the task of controlling vehicle speed and respecting a minimum
distance to traffic ahead [1]. More recently, manufacturers have introduced
lane keep assist (LKA) systems in their vehicles to prevent unintentional
lane changes, for example by applying a corrective torque to the steering
wheel [2]. With the LKA the task of keeping the vehicle in the lane is shared
between the driver and the system. Development of driver assistance does
not stop at that. A next step taken in the automobile industry is to combine
automated speed control with steering to assist the driver in traffic jams
[3], sometimes referred to as the traffic jam assist (TJA) system. While
the driver is still required to keep the hands on the steering wheel, direct
control of throttle, braking, and steering are automated. Future systems
are expected to increase the level of automation further. An example is the
platooning system that allows several vehicles to form road trains [4]. As
the vehicle joins the platoon the driver hands over control of both speed
and steering to the platooning system.
An increased level of automation in aviation has been shown to improve
safety, reliability, fuel economy, and comfort [5]. These benefits are now ex-
pected in the automotive domain, partly because human driving capabilities
are considered to be limited [6]. As an example, the short inter-vehicle dis-
tance required to take advantage of reduced aerodynamic drag in platooning
is not considered controllable by a human driver [7]. Another expected ben-
efit is that problems with driver distraction will be reduced when the human
operator is removed [8].
Besides improving safety and traffic efficiency, automation is also tar-
1
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geting improved comfort. Since the driver is relieved of routine tasks, he or
she can engage in other, non-driving related activities, or simply relax as
the vehicle cruises to its destination [1]. The results of Paper 1 suggest that
improved comfort is achieved with the ACC, even if this automation system
still requires the driver to maintain full attention on driving. Here, drivers
reported that they felt more rested when arriving at their destination after
driving with ACC compared to driving manually.
However, the introduction of automation also brings potential hazards.
A potential cause of hazards originating from technical systems, that must
be accounted for to ensure safety, is technical failures [9, 10]. With increas-
ing technical complexity, growing size of software content, and additional
electro-mechanical interfaces, the potential for failures increases [11, 12].
This thesis is focused on the effects that technical failures in vehicle au-
tomation have on safety. Specifically, the interaction between automation
and the driver in situations of automation failure is investigated.
1.1 Problem description
Vehicle automation that has the authority to directly control throttle, brakes,
or steering can potentially cause severe accidents. Failure of automation
may therefore have serious safety implications. However, as long as au-
tomation has not completely replaced the human driver, vehicle control can
be taken over by the driver when automation fails. If this transition to man-
ual driving is successful, the failure is prevented from causing an accident
and safety maintained.
The performance of the driver is essential for the success of a transition.
The driver has to realize that it is time to take over and come to a correct
conclusion about the state of the system. The decision on an appropriate
response as well as the execution of that response before the failure has
caused an accident are also required [13]. Unfortunately, previous research
suggests that automation degrades drivers’ awareness and indicates that
monitoring for failures of automation is a task ill-suited to humans [14, 15].
The thesis is dedicated to the study of transitions from automated to
manual driving when automation fails. Specifically, the following questions
are addressed:
• How do drivers respond to failures of vehicle automation?
• What are the consequences for safety when the driver is required to
take over in situations where automation fails?
• How can safety of transitions to manual driving be improved?
2
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1.2 Thesis outline
The remainder of Part I is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 Presents how automation has been implemented in road vehi-
cles and gives a classification of levels of automation. The chapter
also presents a logical architecture of vehicle automation highlighting
its typical components.
Chapter 3 Provides definitions of automation failure and related concepts,
including sections on how to assess the risk associated with failures
and how to attain an acceptable level of safety.
Chapter 4 Introduces theory on driving behavior related to safety of driver
takeover, and presents a review of previous research on driver takeovers
when vehicle automation fails. The chapter ends with a section on how
to improve safety of takeovers.
Chapter 5 Summary of the papers included in Part II of the thesis.
Chapter 6 Concludes the thesis with a presentation of contributions and
suggestions on future work.
3
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Chapter 2
Vehicle automation
The primary control functions of a vehicle include steering, throttle, and
brakes. Human drivers have traditionally been the operators of these control
functions. Potentially, automation can replace the driver completely and
take over all control of the vehicle. While research has shown that it is
technically possible, there are yet no commercially available vehicles for
public roads that do not have a human driver. The current approach to
automation, implemented with the ACC and LKA, is instead to automate
the control functions for a limited set of driving tasks under a limited set
of operational conditions.
This chapter explains how the control functions of the vehicle can be
decomposed. An architecture and a classification of vehicle automation
into levels are also presented.
2.1 Longitudinal and lateral vehicle control
Vehicle control is commonly separated along the longitudinal and lateral
directions [16, 17]. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
For automation as for the driver, the primary functions for longitudinal
control are throttle and brakes. Steering is the primary function for lateral
control. There are however important exceptions, like some stability control
x
y
Figure 2.1: Vehicle model where the longitudinal direction is denoted by x
and the lateral direction denoted by y.
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systems which use differential braking (braking on right or left side) or active
torque distribution (independent control of drive torque to each wheel) for
lateral control [17].
For automation of longitudinal control, the objective may be to main-
tain a desired speed, keep a desired distance to other vehicles, or to avoid
collisions. Here, automated braking for avoidance or mitigation of rear-end
collisions [18] and ACC for speed and distance keeping, are examples of
systems currently available in cars [1]. The control objective of currently
available lateral automation systems is typically to keep the vehicle within
the lane [2, 17], e.g., LKA. Future systems are however envisioned to pro-
vide both collision avoidance and lane changing through automated lateral
control [1].
2.2 Continuous and event-based automation
The time duration that automation takes control the vehicle varies greatly
between automation systems. Stability control systems are active as they
intervene to avoid skidding or spinning out of control. LKA systems that
apply a corrective torque when the driver fails to keep within the lane but
otherwise leaves lateral control to the driver, is another type of system that
is only active for short periods of time. Also collision avoidance systems
are examples of what is here referred to as event-based automation, i.e.,
automation that takes control of the vehicle during a short period of time
(not more than a couple of seconds), in response to an event. For collision
avoidance, the event is an impending collision where the response may be
an application of the brakes [18].
Automation that is not targeting a specific event but instead controls
the vehicle continuously is here referred to as continuous automation. The
ACC is an example of a continuous automation system. When the driver
activates the ACC, control of vehicle speed and distance to other vehicles
are automated. While the ACC provides continuous longitudinal automa-
tion, lateral automation may also be continuous. Vehicle platooning is one
example [4]. Here, both longitudinal and lateral control of the vehicle are
automated. From the time the vehicle joins the platoon until it leaves it,
automation is continuously active.
When the driver is replaced as the operator of the vehicle, there is a risk
for loss of situational awareness, i.e., the driver losing awareness of the states
and processes of the system [14]. This may have serious safety implications
for driver takeovers. With reduced situational awareness, the driver may not
notice or take an inappropriate action in the takeover situation [14, 19]. Also
drivers’ trust in automation may have implications for safety. Too much
6
2.3. Levels of automation
Driver
control
Automation
control
Higher level of automation
Examples CC ACC TJA Platooning
Figure 2.2: Spectrum of automation degree between driver control and au-
tomation control. Examples show how four systems can be mapped to the
spectrum of automation degree. The four systems are: cruise control (CC),
adaptive cruise control (ACC), traffic jam assist (TJA), and platooning.
trust in automation can lead to overreliance where the driver fails to notice
when he or she is required to take over. Research indicates that these issues
are more likely to appear for continuous automation than for event-based
automation [20]. A study by Breyer et al. [21] did not observe overreliance
to event-based automation provided by a lane-keeping assistance system.
The system used in their study provided a corrective steering torque when
the driver got too close to the lane markings, i.e., the system provided event-
based automation. On the other hand, for continuous automation, as we
show in Paper 3, driver performance degrades as an effect of automation
that we attribute to loss of situational awareness. Several other studies
have also shown that continuous automation degrades driver performance
(see for example [22–25]). The topic of driver-automation interaction will
be covered further in Chapter 4.
2.3 Levels of automation
Automation is not a matter of all or nothing. Flemisch et al. [26] argue for
a continuous spectrum of automation degree, between completely manual
(100 % driver control) and fully automated (100 % automation control),
see Figure 2.2. This spectrum may be divided into discrete intermediate
levels of automation. A general approach to define levels of automation is
taken by Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens [13], addressing automation
of any type of control process. Recently, government institutions and a stan-
dardization organization have published definitions of levels of automation
specific for road vehicles, see reports from the German Federal Highway In-
stitute [27], the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in the U.S.
[28], and the SAE International [29].
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The general approach, proposed in [13], describes a model for types and
levels of human interaction with automation. According to that model, au-
tomation may be characterized by the type of automated functions. The
authors list the following four types of functions: information acquisition,
information analysis, decisions and action selection, and action implemen-
tation. For each of these types of functions, automation can range from
fully manual to fully automated. A specific automation system can provide
automation to any degree in the four functions, e.g., a high degree of au-
tomation in one of the functions and low in the rest. While this approach
to characterization of automation is independent of the process (e.g., an
airplane, a chemical process, or an assembly line), it is not trivial how to
apply it to road vehicles.
The more recently published report from the German Federal Highway
Institute [27], specifies five levels of automation specifically for road ve-
hicles. The first of the five levels, "Driver Only", represents completely
manual vehicle control. The remaining four levels are: "Assisted", "Partial
automation", "High automation", and "Full automation". Their definition
of "Assisted" includes systems which deliver either lateral or longitudinal
automation where the driver must monitor the system and be ready to take
over at any point. "Partial automation" is defined as a combination of both
longitudinal and lateral automation. The driver is still required to monitor
the system and be ready to take over at any point. For "High automation"
the responsibility on the driver changes, longitudinal and lateral control are
automated and the driver is not required to permanently monitor the situa-
tion. Driver takeovers are still required at this level of automation, but here
the driver is given a sufficient lead time to respond to a takeover request.
"Full automation" is defined as longitudinal and lateral automation without
relying on the driver. Also here, driver takeovers may be possible. How-
ever, in case the driver fails to respond to a takeover request, the system is
capable of safely bringing the vehicle to a safe state, e.g., brake the vehicle
to a standstill.
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in the U.S. proposes
a similar classification of levels of automation [28], but reserves the highest
level for automation that provides longitudinal and lateral automation for
an entire trip without driver involvement.
The report from SAE International (SAE J3016) [29] proposes a clas-
sification with an additional sixth level. Compared to [27] and [28], this
approach makes a distinction between automation that completely replaces
the driver for parts of journey and for a complete journey. Following SAE
J3016, the first four levels ("Driver Only", "Assisted", "Partial Automa-
tion", and "Conditional Automation") correspond to the first four level of
8
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[27] and [28]. The fifth level, called "High Automation" refers to automation
that, for parts of a journey, replace the driver completely in longitudinal
and lateral control. Here, the driver is not required to be ready to take over.
The sixth and final level, called "Full Automation", is reserved for automa-
tion that completely automates lateral and longitudinal control throughout
a journey.
Another term that is used to describe a level of automation is semi-
automated. In [26] it is suggested that semi-automated is used when either
longitudinal or lateral control is automated. Semi here implies that control
of the vehicle is shared between the driver and automation. A similar def-
inition is used in Paper 3, where semi-automated driving refers to driving
a vehicle that has only longitudinal automation and the driver has to be
prepared to take over at any time.
2.4 System architecture
This section presents a logical architecture of vehicle automation systems.
The intention is not to give an exhaustive description of a complete archi-
tecture and all its constituent components, nor is the architecture intended
to capture complex interaction between automation and the human driver
(driver-automation interaction will be treated in Chapter 4). Instead, the
architecture is provided as an example to highlight some aspects relevant
for the topic of this thesis. One of these aspects is the type of hardware
and software components (e.g., sensors, actuators, and control units) that
automation can be expected to include. These examples of components
serve as input to the identification of potential causes of failures of vehicle
automation, see Section 3.1.
The architecture also indicates possible component redundancy, e.g.,
complementing sensors that provide independently acquired information
about the same entity. This type of redundancy can be used for handling
failures in automation systems (see for example [30–32]).
An illustration of the logical architecture is shown in Figure 2.3. It was
compiled from recent publications on vehicle automation systems [17, 33–
35]. The sensors and actuators included in the architecture are examples of
what an automation system may use. A system implementing a low level of
automation may use only a few of these sensors and actuators while a high
level of automation may use them all and additional ones.
The architecture is divided into three main parts: perception, decision
and control, and actuation.
9
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Camera
Radar
Lidar
GPS
V2x
Other
Sensor
fusion
Decision
making
Control
Brakes
Steering
Throttle
Other
Perception
Decision
and control Actuation
Figure 2.3: A logical architecture of vehicle automation with examples of
components that may be included in the three parts: perception, decision
and control, and actuation.
Perception Automated vehicles are equipped with a range of sensors for
perception of their environment. Camera, radar, and lidar are common
sensors for identifying and classifying objects around the vehicle. Measures
provided by these sensors include relative distance, speed, and acceleration
with respect to surrounding objects. The GPS gives the position of the
vehicle relative the Earth.
Through sensor fusion, information from these and other sources can
form a common picture of the vehicle’s own state and its environment.
Because some sensors complement each other, the fused information can
be more accurate and reliable than information from a single sensor. An
example is the identification of objects in the range of both the camera and
the radar. If both sensors report the presence of an object at the same
position, it is more likely that the object really is where the sensors report
it is. On the other hand, if one sensor indicates an object and the other
sensor does not, sensor fusion can provide an indication of the object along
with a measure of uncertainty due to the conflicting information from the
two sources.
Beside sensors there is ongoing work to provide vehicles with V2x (e.g.,
Vehicle-to-vehicle, Vehicle-to-infrastructure, and Vehicle-to-pedestrian) tech-
nology, i.e., radio communication for exchanging information with other
road users and infrastructure. Advantages are that information can be
distributed between vehicles with short delays, and the physical range of
sensors can be overcome since radio signals can travel longer distances than
sensors are able to measure. Communication also enables negotiation and
10
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other types of cooperation between road users. It is expected that automa-
tion will use V2x to benefit from these advantages [28].
Decision and control With information from sensors and other sources,
decision making algorithms decide on the appropriate actions to take. This
can be a threat assessment algorithm that decides whether to initiate a
collision avoidance maneuver [36] or a lane keep assist system that decides
whether to apply steering [17]. If the algorithm decides to act, this is also
the part of automation that generates control commands to the actuators.
In the case of longitudinal automation, this command can be a desired
acceleration sent to either the power train or brake system [34].
A decision may also be to deactivate continuous automation. Here, an
example is the ACC system which deactivates in case the driver shows that
he or she wants to take over control, e.g., by depressing the brake pedal.
Another reason for automation to deactivate is the detection of a failure
to generate the correct control commands [37]. If an automation failure
is caused by a failure to generate a correct command to the actuators,
the driver may still be able to command the actuators. In such a case a
driver takeover may be appropriate. However, successful driver takeovers
also depend on the situation, i.e., the driver may not capable of controlling
the vehicle in the current situation. The topic of automation deactivation
and associated driver takeover is addressed in Paper 4 and will be further
covered in Chapter 4.
Actuation The primary control functions are the same for automation
as for the driver, i.e., throttle, brakes, and steering. Throttle and brakes
are typically used for longitudinal control and steering is mainly for lateral
control. There is however inherent redundancy in these control functions.
Differential braking and driving-torque distribution can be used to generate
lateral motion if the steering actuator fails [32].
This type of redundancy is outside the control of the driver, i.e., the
driver cannot distribute braking or driving-torque between wheels. There-
fore, if a driver takeover is to be a successful strategy for handling a failure
of automation, the actuators which the driver uses must still be functional.
Most essential is that braking and steering are available to the driver. If
these control functions are unavailable to the driver, there is no advantage
in given him or her control of the vehicle when automation fails. On the
other hand, if the actuators are fully functional and the cause of the failure
is due to a fault in the sensors or the decision and control parts, then a
driver takeover may be appropriate.
11
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Automation failures
This chapter presents definitions of concepts related to automation failures.
There is a section on potential causes of failures as well as a section on
means to attain dependable automation. The chapter also presents how
to assess the risk of potential failures and how this relates to the driver’s
capability to take over in order to control automation failures.
First, the concept of automation failures is defined. An automation fail-
ure occurs when automation no longer delivers correct service (following the
definition of a failure in [38]). Correct service is delivered when automation
provides its intended functionality, which is usually defined in the func-
tional specification. However, it should be remembered that an incorrect
specification can itself be the source of failure [9].
3.1 Causes of automation failure
Vehicle automation is made of a complex combination of hardware and
software. The complexity allows for advanced functionality, but also implies
numerous sources of failure.
Vehicle automation systems typically consist of a perception part, a de-
cision and control part, and an actuation part (see Section 2.4). When
allocated to the electronic architecture of the vehicle, these parts are gen-
erally implemented on computer nodes that are inter-connected via a com-
munication bus network [9, 39–42], see schematic illustration in Figure 3.1.
The components of a specific node depend on its functionality, e.g., a node
that has an interface to the video camera may have some circuits dedicated
to video processing. There are also generic hardware components present
in most nodes. Examples of these generic components are shown for the
Control unit in Figure 3.1.
All components of the automation system are potential sources of fail-
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Figure 3.1: Generic components of automotive electronic systems including
nodes, communication bus, and power supply. The expanded view of the
control unit node shows some of the constituent hardware parts of this
node. Also the sensor, actuator, and V2x nodes generally share this set of
hardware parts.
ure. When a component or a complete system fails, its delivered service
deviates from the correct (intended) in some way. The way in which a com-
ponent or system fails is called a failure mode. Examples of failure modes
of automotive systems are given in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Examples of failure modes for components of automation
Component Failure mode examples [6, 9, 43]
Sensor Out of range, Stuck in range, Offset, No output
Actuator No response, Response stuck, Offset
Communication Loss, Delay, Corruption
Power supply Under and over voltage, Voltage drift, Power spikes
Processing unit Stuck, No software code execution, Execution too slow
Memory Stuck high or low, Bit flips
I/O Stuck high or low, Drift
Clock Stuck, Incorrect frequency, Period jitter
An indication of what can fail in a highly automated vehicle was pre-
sented by Lygeros, Godbole, and Broucke [30]. Their analysis of faults in
an automated highway system (AHS) focused on the system capabilities
that may be affected by faults. This included sensor capabilities such as
measuring of velocity and relative distance to other vehicles, actuator capa-
14
3.2. Attaining dependable automation
bilities including braking, throttle, and steering, and finally communication
capabilities which for the AHS was infrared and radio.
3.2 Attaining dependable automation
Means to attain dependability may be described as fault prevention, fault
tolerance, fault removal, or fault forecasting [38]. Fault removal and fault
forecasting serve as means to justify the dependability of the system, i.e.,
provide confidence that the functional and dependability requirements are
adequate and met. The two concepts for providing dependability are fault
prevention and fault tolerance. Fault prevention is applied to prevent the
occurrence or introduction of faults by means of a rigorous development
process or by appropriate design principles. The purpose of fault toler-
ance on the other hand, is to avoid failures when faults are present. The
use of redundancy is one approach to achieve fault tolerance. For vehicle
automation this may include redundancy of sensors and actuators but also
other components such as power supplies, communication buses, and control
units, see Section 2.4.
Fault tolerance and fault prevention measures applied to vehicle au-
tomation often aim at ensuring safety. However, availability (readiness for
correct service) and reliability (continuity of correct service) are two related
attributes of dependability that are also commonly considered. Improving
one of these attributes does not necessarily have to improve the other and
the result may be a tradeoff [38]. It can for example be safer to disable (at
the expense of availability) automation under some conditions, rather than
to allow it to operate with poor reliability. Disabling automation may be a
viable approach when the driver can safely take over control of the vehicle
(see Section 2.4). For high levels of automation where the driver cannot be
expected to take over, availability and reliability are both crucial to safety.
As a result, the requirements on dependability are stricter for higher levels
of automation. Here, the necessary level of fault tolerance may be achieved
by including an alternative control system that maintains safety in case the
nominal automation system fails [44]. This alternative control system could
for example bring the vehicle to a safe stop by the side of the road.
3.3 Functional safety
Functional safety is the part of a system’s dependability that is concerned
with safety of the service that the system delivers [11]. If a system fails
to deliver its intended service this can cause a hazard, here defined as a
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potential source of harm. An example of a hazard relevant for functional
safety is loss of braking capability due to a failure of the brake system.
Hazards related to electric shock, toxicity, fire, and heat are not part of
functional safety unless directly caused by a service failure.
One of the measures that the automotive industry has implemented to
achieve an acceptable level of functional safety is the use of a rigorous de-
velopment process, defined by commonly accepted guidelines and standards
[9, 45]. These guidelines and standards typically define a safety process
that complements the overall development process. Identification and clas-
sification of hazards caused by failures is a fundamental part of this safety
process. The process identifies what hazards need to be considered and
also determines the amount of effort that needs to be dedicated to avoiding
the occurrence of these hazards. The amount of effort is given by a risk
assessment of the hazards. In conclusion, this means that each individual
hazard identifies an issue that must be considered, whereas the hazard with
the highest risk sets the required amount of effort for avoiding the hazards.
3.3.1 Risk function
The concept of risk is defined as a combination of the probability of harm
to persons and the potential severity of that harm [9, 45]. In order to
perform risk assessment, this can be formulated as a function (F) of the
three parameters, frequency of occurrence (f), ability of the persons involved
to control the situation and avoid harm (C), and severity of the potential
harm (S):
R = F (f, C, S)
The frequency parameter (f) can be further subdivided into the failure
rate (λ) of the system causing the hazard and the probability of being
exposed (E) to a situation where the hazard can cause harm. The resulting
function is the following:
R = F (λ,E,C, S)
This representation of risk and its factors are illustrated in Figure 3.2.
A hazardous event is in this case a state where people are exposed to a
hazard. Unless the driver or other involved persons are able to control the
situation, an accident will occur, where severity represents the amount of
harm.
When risk is to be assessed, the individual factors of the risk function are
estimated. Exposure is determined by analyzing the operational situations
of the vehicle, to find out how often the situation is such that the hazard
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Figure 3.2: Model of risk function for vehicle hazards. Adapted from [9,
45].
may cause harm. Severity is assessed by considering the potential amount
of harm on a scale from no injuries to life threatening. Controllability is
determined by assessing the percentage of drivers or other persons that
would control the hazardous event.
Papers 1, 2, and 3 give some guidance on how to assess controllability
in automated driving. The results of Paper 1 indicate that drivers may
fail to respond in a hazardous event because they are not aware of the
full functionality of automation. Paper 2 found that when longitudinal
automation partially failed to decelerate, fewer drivers managed to control
the situation than when automation completely failed to decelerate. A
conclusion of Paper 3 is that an increased level of automation leads to
decreased controllability.
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Chapter 4
Safety of transitions to manual
driving
It is easy to illustrate why transitions from automated to manual driving
can be hazardous. Imagine being the driver of a highly automated car when
suddenly, in the middle of a busy intersection, automation disengages with-
out notice, requiring you to take over control. This situation is an extreme
example given to show the potential safety implications of inappropriate
transitions to manual control. Nonetheless, it is important that drivers are
aware and capable of taking over when automation disengages. A vehicle
that is not operated by either an automation system or a human driver may
quickly enter into a hazardous event.
This thesis focuses on driver takeovers specifically in situations when
automation fails. However, there are other, more frequently occurring situa-
tions that also involve driver takeover. Situations where automation reaches
its functional limitations are typical examples. Specifically for the ACC,
its ability to adjust to stationary objects is limited and therefore requires
the driver to take over when approaching stationary vehicles, e.g., a queue
of vehicles. It is expected that also higher levels of automation will have
functional limitations [27–29]. A difference compared to ACC may be that
systems providing a higher level of automation have the ability to detect
when the vehicle approaches its functional limitations. This ability would
allow the system to alert the driver in due time before exceeding the limita-
tions. Still, it is essential that the driver and the automation system have
a common view about who has control of the vehicle.
The following sections of this chapter present theory on driving behavior
relevant in the context of driver takeovers. This is followed by results from
studies of driver takeovers before the chapter ends with a section on how to
improve safety of takeovers.
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4.1 Related theory on driving behavior
When automation is introduced to assist or replace the human operator it
often affects human behavior [15, 46]. This is true also for vehicle automa-
tion where the role of the driver changes as the task of driving is different in
manual compared to automated modes (see for example [23, 47]). Instead
of only involving direct control of the vehicle, the driving task also involves
interaction with automation. This has implications for driving behavior
that may affect safety.
An effect of automation related to driving behavior that is argued by
Parasuraman and Manzey [48] is complacency. Typically operationalized
as poorer detection of malfunctions under automation than under manual
control, complacency has been used to explain the lack of driver response to
vehicle automation failures [19]. The presence of complacency has primarily
been observed in a multitask environment (i.e., the driver is responsible
for both automated and manual tasks) with high workload, where drivers
actively reallocate their attention away from the automated and towards
the manual tasks [48].
Degraded driving performance as a result of the implementation of au-
tomation has also been explained by the out-of-the-loop performance prob-
lem. Linked by Endsley and Kiris [14] to "loss of manual skills and loss of
awareness of the state and processes of the system", this potential problem
with automation was identified as a contributing factor to the results in Pa-
per 3. It was shown in Paper 3 that a higher level of automation negatively
affected driving performance in situations with automation failure.
In addition to complacency and situational awareness, driving behavior
may be explained by the driver’s mental model of automation. The mental
model is used to predict system behavior, guide drivers’ actions [49], and is
important for drivers’ ability to detect automation failures. A driver that
detects a difference between predicted and actual behavior may question
the accuracy of the mental model but with confidence in the model, he or
she may question whether the actual behavior of automation is correct, i.e.,
question if automation is failing. The results of Paper 1 suggest that some
drivers with an ACC system in their vehicle have a somewhat rudimentary
mental model of the system and could therefore overlook signs of failure.
Developing an accurate mental model of automation is achieved through
both theoretical information (e.g., from a user manual) and experience of
use [50, 51]. In order for experience of use to improve the model, the driver
needs feedback from automation. As the driver interacts with automation
and receives feedback about how the vehicle behaves in automated mode,
the driver learns how automation responds to various traffic situations. Ad-
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ditionally, there is research suggesting that providing feedback about vehicle
and automation states on in-vehicle displays have a positive effect of drivers’
ability to control failures and to deal with functional limitations of automa-
tion [52, 53]. This will be further examined in Section 4.3.
4.2 Studies of transitions to manual driving
For a transition to manual driving to be safe, the driver has to recognize
the need for a takeover as well as apply the correct actions. The time
available to the driver to take over control before an accident occurs is
essential to the success of the takeover [54]. The ability of the driver to
predict the takeover and the driver’s previous experience of taking over
are also important. In manual driving, it has been shown that drivers
are faster at applying braking when the event they are responding to is
expected, i.e., the driver can predict its occurrence [55]. The same effect is
observed in automated driving where drivers have been observed to respond
faster to expected take over requests than to takeovers which appear as a
surprise to the driver [56]. As argued in Paper 2, automation failures occur
unexpectedly and the driver has no experience of taking over control when
it happens. Hence, takeovers initiated by automation failures are believed
to be associated with longer response times than takeovers initiated by
expected events.
Takeovers initiated by functional limitations are to some extent expected
takeovers as they are part of the intended functionality of automation.
Drivers may have previous experience of such takeovers and can potentially
predict their occurrence. Results from studies of takeovers initiated by func-
tional limitations are therefore not necessarily representative for unexpected
takeovers initiated by automation failures. Nevertheless, for a takeover ini-
tiated by a functional limitation to be expected by the driver, he or she
needs to know what the limits are. As observed in Paper 1, drivers may
not have this knowledge as mental models of automation may be somewhat
rudimentary.
Studies of driver takeovers that focus on unexpected takeovers, initiated
by automation failures, suggest that drivers do not always take over when
the situation demands. It has been found that 50% of the participants of a
driving simulator study did not take over when the automated vehicle (both
longitudinal and lateral automation), failed to brake in order to maintain a
safe distance to the vehicle ahead [19]. Another study, conducted on a test
track, concluded that drivers were late in taking over control from an ACC
system when the system failed and accelerated towards the vehicle ahead
[23].
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Inappropriate or complete lack of driver response was also observed by
Stanton, Young, and McCaulder [57] in a driving simulator study of ACC
failure. Their study was designed such that the drivers had to take over
or otherwise collide with the vehicle ahead when the ACC incorrectly ac-
celerated. It was found that 4 out of 12 drivers collided with the vehicle
ahead. Papers 2 and 3 further analyzed driver takeovers when automation
fails by studying differences between complete and partial failures, as well
as differences between different levels of automation. Among the results,
the two papers confirm the conclusion of previous studies that drivers can-
not be assumed to constantly monitor the situation and always be ready to
take over control when automation fails.
4.3 Improving safety of transitions to manual
driving
Instead of relying on the driver in a takeover situation, automation can
maintain some functionality to achieve safety, e.g., bring the vehicle to safe
stop if the driver fails to take over [27, 29, 58]. This approach addresses
safety of takeovers and will be necessary for high levels of automation, where
the human driver is relieved of safety responsibilities. However, implement-
ing such functionality will be technically challenging due to the wide range
of possible traffic situations and limited capabilities of sensor systems.
An alternative approach to achieve safety of driver takeovers is to provide
the driver with information. Studies of the effects of providing information
to the driver have shown promising results. Seppelt and Lee [52] showed
that by continuously providing feedback about the states of automation,
driver performance was improved when situations where functional limita-
tions of the ACC required driver takeover. Also, providing drivers with
information about uncertainty has been demonstrated to improve safety of
driver takeovers [53]. Here, participants using an ACC in a driving simula-
tor were presented with uncertainty information about the reliability of the
sensor readings. Results of the study showed that safety of takeovers was
improved when drivers were provided with the uncertainty information.
Safety of driver takeovers can also be improved by alerting the driver
when a takeover is necessary. An ACC developed according to ISO 15622
[37] shall for example notify the driver if it deactivates automatically or
becomes unavailable due to a failure. However, for automation to be able
to notify the driver, it requires that automation knows when a takeover is
necessary. ACC systems that ignore stationary objects require the driver
to take over when approaching stationary vehicles [23]. Because the system
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ignores stationary objects it is also unable to determine when the takeover
is required and therefore cannot notify the driver. Such behavior will not
be acceptable for higher levels of automation, where the driver is no longer
required to constantly monitor automation and be prepared to resume con-
trol. Instead, automation will have to recognize its functional limitations
and issue a takeover request to the driver with sufficient advance notice
[27–29].
Paper 4 proposes a method to improve safety of transitions to manual
driving that builds on the approaches mentioned in this section. First, it
assumes the existence of functionality to maintain safety (keep the vehicle
in a safe state) even if the driver fails to take over. Second, the method
requires a human-machine-interface for notifying the driver of requests to
take over. The contribution of Paper 4 is that it adds a method to assess
whether the individual driver is capable of taking over control in a given
situation. If the driver is not expected to be capable of taking over, safety
is maintained by keeping the vehicle in an automated mode of operation.
The method proposed in Paper 4 requires automation to have such a mode
of operation, where safety is maintained despite the lack of driver takeover.
Thus, the method is primarily intended for high levels of automation, where
such a mode is available [27, 29].
4.3.1 Driver capability
The framework for safer transitions to manual driving, presented in Pa-
per 4, uses an estimate of driver capability to determine whether a driver
takeover can be performed safely or not. Here, driver capability refers to
the capability of the driver to safely control the vehicle in a given traffic
situation. The capability is expressed mathematically, as a subset of the ve-
hicle’s state-space, denoted Driver-Controllability-Set (DCS). If the vehicle
states belong to the DCS the driver is expected to be capable of controlling
the situation. If vehicle states are outside the DCS, it is uncertain whether
the driver is capable of safely controlling the vehicle in the situation. A
schematic illustration of the sets is provided in Figure 4.1, where V and D
denote the vehicle’s state space and the DCS, respectively. The figure also
shows two trajectories (T1 and T2), where T1 represents a situation where
the vehicle states start and remain within D, whereas T2 represents a situ-
ation where the vehicle states exit D. Driver takeovers are only assessed as
safe for T1. Here the driver is given time to take over control of the vehicle
since the vehicle states remain within D. For T2 it is uncertain whether the
driver will be capable of taking over since vehicle states leave the set that
is considered controllable by the driver.
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DV
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T2 time
Figure 4.1: Schematic illustration of vehicle state-space and driver-
controllability-set.
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Summary of included papers
This chapter provides brief summaries of the appended papers. Full versions
of the papers are included in Part II.
Paper 1 Exploring end-user experiences: self-perceived
notions on use of adaptive cruise control systems
Summary
This paper explores drivers’ experiences of using vehicle automation sys-
tems. It was expected that drivers’ use of automation would change with
time-of-use. The study therefore engaged drivers with experience of com-
mercially available ACC systems. A total of 17 drivers took part in the
study which was conducted as three focus group interview sessions.
The study focused on four topics: usage of the system, trust in the
system, implications of the ACC’s functional limitations, and changes in
behavior after use.
Concerning usage of the system, most participants reported using the
ACC primarily on rural roads when traffic density was not high. However,
others gave accounts of using it in roundabouts and in high-density traffic.
Related to trust, some drivers stated that they believed the system could
not fail in an unsafe manner, whereas others indicated lower levels of trust.
Trust was also found to be linked to functional limitations, as drivers felt
they could put more trust in the system when they learned about limita-
tions in its functionality. Even if these limitations are clearly stated in the
manual, users learned about them after using the system in situations it was
not designed for. The study also indicated that some drivers had somewhat
rudimentary mental models of the system. As a consequence, these drivers
would likely not be able to detect automation failures since they were not
fully of aware of the correct functionality of the ACC.
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Author’s contribution
The study was carried out by the thesis author in collaboration with N.
Strand. This included all stages of the study, from designing and planning
it, to analysis of the collected data. The paper was mainly written by N.
Strand with input from the thesis author.
Paper 2 Driver performance in the presence of adap-
tive cruise control related failures: Implications for safety
analysis and fault tolerance
Summary
Previous research has found that drivers may have problems taking over
control of the vehicle when automation fails, see Chapter 4. The results
of Paper 1 also indicate that some drivers are ill-prepared to respond to
automation failures.
Paper 2 describes a driving simulator study investigating ACC-related
failures. While the previous studies have focused on one type of failure each
(i.e., Stanton, Young, and McCaulder [57] and Rudin-Brown and Parker [23]
looked at an acceleration failure and Waard et al. [19] looked at a decelera-
tion failure), this paper compared the outcome of unintended acceleration,
complete deceleration failure, partial deceleration failure, and speeding fail-
ure.
The purpose of the study was to analyze the effect of the failures and
identify differences between the four types of failures. The analysis was
focused on the strategy applied by the drivers, i.e., what response they
chose to apply to control the hazardous events caused by the failures.
Results showed that the participating drivers primarily used steering to
avoid collisions when the ACC failed to decelerate, and when the ACC in-
correctly started to accelerate towards a preceding vehicle. It was also found
that the subjects were more successful in controlling a complete decelera-
tion failure compared to a partial deceleration failure. This suggests that
safety can be improved by forcing partial deceleration failure into complete
deceleration failure. However, the subjects colliding after a partial deceler-
ation failure had a much reduced impact speed compared to those exposed
to a complete deceleration failure. This, on the other hand, suggests that
partial deceleration failures may be less critical.
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The study was carried out by the thesis author in collaboration with N.
Strand. This included all stages of the study, from designing and planning
it, to analysis of the collected data. The paper was written by the thesis
author.
Paper 3 Semi-automated versus highly automated driv-
ing in critical situations caused by automation failures
Summary
The results of Paper 2 indicated that a partial deceleration failure was
more difficult for drivers to control than a complete deceleration failure. A
follow-up study was conducted to further investigate this difference between
deceleration failures and to also look at the effect of level of automation on
driver takeovers. An experimental design with two levels of automation
and three degrees of deceleration failure was set up. An ACC system and
a TJA (Traffic Jam Assist) system were used as a lower and higher level
of automation, respectively. For the failures, a moderate, a severe, and a
complete failure to decelerate were used in the experiments.
Results of this study did not observe a significant difference between the
deceleration failures, i.e., a partial failure were not found to be less control-
lable than a complete deceleration failure. No single reason explained the
inconsistency between the studies; instead it was argued that differences in
driving simulators, differences in scenarios, and differences between imple-
mentations of automation may have contributed.
The effect of level of automation was found to be significant, with more
safety critical and fewer successful takeovers with higher level of automa-
tion. The out-of-the-loop performance problem caused by loss of situational
awareness, described in Section 4.1, was believed to have contributed to this
effect.
A conclusion from this result was that lateral automation affects driver
takeovers of longitudinal control. The automation failures only affected
longitudinal automation. Still the group that drove with both longitudinal
and lateral automation (TJA) performed worse than the group that drove
with only longitudinal automation (ACC).
Author’s contribution
The study was carried out by the thesis author in collaboration with N.
Strand. This included all stages of the study, from designing and planning
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it, to analysis of the collected data. The paper was jointly written by the
thesis author and N. Strand.
Paper 4 Safe Transitions from Automated to Manual
Driving using Driver Controllability Estimation
Summary
Papers 1, 2, and 3 all indicate that driver takeovers, when vehicle automa-
tion fails, may be hazardous. At the same time, a successful takeover can
ensure that the failing automation system is contained and prevented from
causing a hazard. Another benefit of driver takeover is that the vehicle is
kept operational. After a successful takeover, the driver can continue to
drive the vehicle manually.
Considering these benefits while respecting the potential problems with
driver takeovers, it is desirable to be able to assess when a takeover is
safe. Paper 4 proposes a method to perform such an assessment using an
estimate of the driver’s capability to control the vehicle. It is recognized that
capabilities vary between individuals and an estimation is therefore online
adapted. While the vehicle is operated in manual mode (i.e., the driver is in
control), data on safety-related vehicle states are collected. The distribution
of the collected data reveals what vehicle states the driver has experience
of and typically operates under. The driver’s capability is expressed as the
subset of the vehicle’s state space that is typically used by the individual
driver, defined as the Driver-Controllability-Set (DCS), see Section 4.3.1.
The assessment of whether the driver can safely take over is performed
by checking if the states of the vehicle are within DCS. This involves the
prediction of future vehicle states over the time horizon that the takeover is
assumed to require to complete. Finally, it is checked whether the current
and predicted vehicle states are within DCS. If they are, the driver is deemed
capable of taking over control of the vehicle.
The method for estimating DCS was evaluated on data from four drivers,
showing that the method successfully finds each drivers typical region of
operation. One of the four drivers was also used to evaluate the assessment
of whether a takeover is safe. Given the limited scale of evaluation, further
validation is necessary. Nevertheless, results indicate that the method is
able to assess when takeovers can be performed safely.
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Author’s contribution
The work behind the paper, including development of ideas, planning of
experiments, and collection and analysis of data, was performed by the
thesis author. Most of the paper was written by the thesis author.
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Concluding remarks
This chapter concludes the thesis by presenting its contribution and sug-
gesting directions for future research.
6.1 Contribution
The goal of this thesis is to improved safety of transitions to manual driving
when vehicle automation fails. This is achieved by first contributing to the
understanding of driving behavior in takeover situations. Second, based on
the improved understanding, present a method for assessing the safety of
given control to the driver when automation fails. The method can be used
to avoid unsafe transitions from automated to manual driving when the
driver is incapable of taking over.
On the topic of understanding driving behavior, the first contributions
of this thesis concern some of the underlying processes behind drivers’ re-
sponses to failing automation:
• Through interviews with users of vehicle automation it was found
that drivers have been involved in critical situations because they, as
a result of using automation, did not pay enough attention to the road
ahead. The results of Paper 1 confirm that this effect, which is a well
know side effect of automation and which has been observed in other
domains (e.g., aviation), is present also in road vehicles with the type
of automation provided by ACC.
• Drivers’ mental model of vehicle automation may be lacking impor-
tant aspects even after several months of usage. The testimonials
from users of ACC systems reported in Paper 1 indicate that drivers’
mental model, including their understanding of system capabilities
and functional limitations may be incomplete or inaccurate. This has
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implications for drivers’ ability to detect and diagnose failures of au-
tomation. Without a complete and accurate mental model, the driver
lacks the necessary knowledge to distinguish faulty from correct sys-
tem behavior.
While these contributions give an indication of how drivers may control
automation failures, the following contributions specifically show the effects
of failures.
• Steering may be a commonly applied strategy by drivers when they
are faced with a hazardous event in which longitudinal automation
fails. This conclusion was drawn in Paper 2 after studying driving be-
havior in a driving simulator equipped with an ACC for longitudinal
automation. In situations where automation failed to decelerate for
a braking preceding vehicle and the adjacent lane was free from traf-
fic, steering was the most commonly applied strategy by the drivers.
A safety implication of applying steering, as opposed to braking, is
that the hazardous event may reappear the next time automation is
required to decelerate. If the driver instead applies braking, this is
typically interpreted as a signal to disengage longitudinal automation
and give control to the driver.
• The probability that drivers control a hazardous event caused by a
failure of automation to decelerate, may depend on the extent of the
failure, i.e., how much the level of deceleration deviates from the cor-
rect. Paper 2 compared a partial deceleration failure with a complete
deceleration failure and observed more collisions after a partial decel-
eration failure than after a complete deceleration failure. However, the
subsequent study, reported in Paper 3, compared three levels of decel-
eration failures and did not observe an increased number of collisions
for partial compared to complete deceleration failures.
• An increased level of automation has a negative effect on controlla-
bility in hazardous events caused by deceleration failures. The study
outlined in Paper 3 showed that fewer drivers controlled hazardous
events caused by deceleration failures when the level of automation
was increased. The two levels of automation compared in the study
were longitudinal automation and a combination of longitudinal and
lateral automation. The conclusion was that lateral automation has
a negative effect on driver controllability for hazardous events cased
by longitudinal automation failures.
This far the contributions have focused on the effects of failing automa-
tion and associated driver responses. A relationship has been identified
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between the outcome of a hazardous event caused by failing automation,
the type of automation provided in the vehicle, the type of failure occur-
ring, and the response applied by the driver. With these findings taken into
account, the following contributions are made on the topic of improving
safety of transitions to manual driving:
• A framework for deciding, in a given driving situation, if it is safe
to transfer control from the automation system to the driver. The
framework is presented in Paper 4 and proposes a decision logic that
is based on an estimate of the individual driver’s capability to control
the vehicle.
• A method to estimate drivers’ takeover capability that adapts to the
individual driver, see Paper 4. While the driver operates the vehi-
cle in manual mode, the capability of the driver is estimated as the
subset of the vehicle’s state space where the driver typically operates.
Takeovers conducted within this subset are considered safe from a
driver capability perspective since the driver normally operates the
vehicle manually in this region of the state space.
6.2 Future work
The aim of Papers 1, 2, and 3 was to build knowledge on vehicle automation
in general. For practical reasons, the studies investigated the two systems
ACC and TJA. Future work should also look at other systems and especially
higher levels of automation, where the driver is not required to constantly
supervise automation. An important issue here is how much time the driver
requires to safely take over control. This time probably depends on several
factors including the situation, the state of the driver, and the capabilities
of the driver.
While the method proposed in Paper 4 considers the capabilities of the
driver in takeover situations, it does not take into account the current state
of the driver. Driver state (i.e., drowsiness/fatigue and distraction) is rec-
ognized as an important factor to the success of a driver takeover [59] and
should be considered for future work.
The approach to driver capability estimation proposed in Paper 4 should
also be the subject of future research. Studies should be conducted using
driving simulators as well as with real vehicles to validate the approach on
a larger number of drivers and under varying driving conditions.
Another interesting direction for future work is to extend the framework
presented in Paper 4 with a method to steer the states of the vehicle into the
set that is controllable by the driver. Currently the framework only includes
33
Chapter 6. Concluding remarks
a method to give a yes or no answer to whether the driver is capable of taking
over. If it is found that the driver is not capable of taking over, it may still
be possible to move the vehicle into a state that is controllable by the driver
and delay the takeover until this state is reached. A trivial example can be
to brake the vehicle in order to increase the distance to a preceding vehicle.
More involved maneuvers may use both longitudinal and lateral control to
reach a state where the driver can take over control of the vehicle.
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